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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

DAYTON J. BELGARD,

11956

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Dayton J. Belgard appeals from judgment and conviction entered against him in a jury trial before the District
Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for Weber
County, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of second degreee burglary
by jury trial in the District Court of the Second Judicial
District, in and for the County of Weber, State of Utah, and
was sentenced according to law to imprisonment in the Utah
State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The judgment of the verdict of guilty rendered in the
District Court should be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with the facts as expressed by appellant in his brief, with the following additions and clarifications.
An officer who was present when defendant made the
statement of confession testified that defendant was advised that he could consult an attorney, and that he was
not subjected to fear, threats or promises (Tr. 142). The
officer typed the confession as defendant submitted it (Tr.
144).
Another officer, also present when the statement was
made, testified that defendant was told he could have an
attorney, and that defendant was not subjected to any
threats or promises (Tr. 171).
The confession was admitted by the Court over defense
counsel's objection (Tr. 184). Defense counsel's objection
was on the grounds the Miranda warning was not complied
with.
In proceedings out of presence of the jury, both of the

attorneys and the judge had discussed the issue whether
admission of the confession should be denied on the ground
the Miranda rule was not complied with. The judge decided
that the Miranda decision did not apply and that he would
admit the confession into evidence (Tr. 99).
The appellant raises no issue as to whether pre·
Miranda standards were complied with; respondent submits that they were. Appellant's only argument is that the

Miranda ruling should have been applied to case at bar
(Appellant's brief at 3).

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INTERPRETING THE LAW TO BE THAT THE
MIRANDA DECISION IS NOT BINDING UPON
CASE AT BAR, BECAUSE MIRANDA DOES
NOT APPLY TO ANY RETRIAL OF A DEFENDANT WHOSE FIRST TRIAL COMMENCED
PRIOR TO JUNE 13, 1966.
The United States Supreme Court held in Jenkins v.
Delaware, 89 S. Ct. 1677, 395 U. S. 213 (1969), that the
ruling in Miranda does not apply to any retrial of a defendant whose first trial commenced prior to June 13, 1966.
The first trial of defendant in case at bar commenced
prior to June 13, 1966 (R. 30). He was tried again in 1969
for the same conduct that was the subject of his prior trial
(Tr. 1-213).
Appellant argues that the 1969 trial was not a retrial
under the Jen kins rule (Appellant's brief at 6).
Respondent submits that it makes no difference under
the Jenkins rule whether the 1969 trial of the appellant was
a retrial or was not a retrial.
"[I]t is immaterial whether State law treats a
retrial as the continuation of the original trial, [citation omitted], or as a completely new trial that
proceeds as if the former trial never occurred. [Citation omitted.] What is determinative is that the
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defendant is being tried for the same conduct that
was the subject of a previously reversed conviction"
Jenkins v. Delaware, supra, at footnote No. 10.
(Emphasis added.)
Whether or not we choose to treat the 1969 trial as a
retrial or as a continuation of the former trial which was
never held due to the appellant's plea of guilty, it makes
absolutely no difference. The appellant was charged with
a crime in 1963; he pleaded guilty to the charge and was
convicted. In 1969, the federal court found that the record
did not show that the plea was valid. Belgard v. Turner,
307 F. Supp. 936 (10th Cir. 1969).
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Pursuant to the federal court's decision, appellant was
allowed to replead. He pleaded not guilty and was tried in
1969 - this time before a jury - and was convicted for
the same conduct that was the subject of the 1963 conviction.
Furthermore, the granting of the writ of habeas corpus
in the federal court, Belgard v. Turner, supra, was equivalent to a reversal on appeal. Thus, defendant was tried for
the same conduct that was the subject of a previously reversed conviction, which places him exactly under the rule
in Jenkins case. Miranda does not apply to the 1969 trial.
CONCLUSION
The Court below did not err in not applying the
Miranda rule in the 1969 trial of appellant, because the
1969 trial was within the rule in Jenkins v. Delaware, hold-
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ing that Miranda does not apply to a retrial of a defendant
whose first trial commenced prior to June 1'3, 1966.
The judgment and conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BE.A:SLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

